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My encounters with Robin Attfield have been diverse, even though we 
had never met until the colloquium in his honour in Cardiff in 2009. I 
knew of course of his books on environmental ethics, and I was therefore 
delighted to be sent for review his more recent Creation, Evolution and 
Meaning (Attfield, 2006a).  I described this without hesitation as “an 
important work of philosophical theology”, and noted that I was “full of 
admiration for the clarity of thought that underlies every part of this book” 
(Southgate, 2008a). I was particularly helped by his treatment of evolution 
and suffering, which contributed significantly to my own recent 
monograph The Groaning of Creation (Southgate, 2008b).  
So I was delighted to receive an affirmative email from Attfield about 
Groaning. It’s par for the course in academe that no sooner is one’s own 
book out that another book in the same area appears immediately. A 
philosophical treatment of the problem of animal suffering was duly 
published straight after my own book. This was Michael J. Murray’s 
Nature Red in Tooth and Claw, which I was able to ask Attfield to review 
(Murray, 2008; Attfield, 2009a). I will return to Murray’s book later in this 
chapter. But meanwhile I had the extraordinary privilege, at a conference 
in Crete in 2008, of standing in for Robin Attfield, reading out his paper 
and fielding questions on the latest version of his argument on 
stewardship. 
So I have had plenty of opportunity recently both to appreciate Attfield’s 
work and even to pretend to be him! What I want to do in this present 
piece is to comment on the relation between his position on evolutionary 
theodicy and my own, and then consider how that difference in theological 
approach might be correlated with a difference in ethical emphasis. 
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Attfield on Evolutionary Theodicy 
One of the great merits of Attfield’s treatment of evolutionary 
suffering is his nuanced and critical approach to evolutionary theory, 
which is like any good theory full of internal arguments (Attfield, 2006a, 
109-14). This bears very much on his final question: “Could things be 
otherwise?” (Attfield, 2006a, 147-50) and hence on the burden of suffering 
that the evolutionary theodicist is tasked with addressing. The jury is very 
much out on the adequacy of natural selection alone as an evolutionary 
mechanism. Yet the theologian should be very wary of the assumption that 
God had to input “information” to effect certain key transitions—the 
implication of Holmes Rolston’s position in his Gifford Lectures, 
published as Genes, Genesis and God (Rolston, 1999). I think Attfield 
may be over-charitable to Rolston, and to Keith Ward, in supposing that 
they are positing purely naturalistic schemes as explanations for how 
evolution has given rise to the outcomes that it has (Attfield, 2006a, 149-
50). Rolston writes, 
 
for the key transitions in evolutionary history new information is needed in 
enormous amounts and… one cannot just let this information float in from 
nowhere… there is a Ground of Information… otherwise known as God. 
(Rolston, 1999, 359). 
 
Ward writes in his God, Chance and Necessity,  
 
Taking natural selection alone, it seems to me highly unlikely that rational 
beings should ever come to exist in a universe like this… I regard 
evolution by natural selection as a much more insecure and precarious 
process than seems compatible with the theistic idea of a goal-directed 
process… a continuing causal activity of God seems the best explanation 
of the progress towards greater consciousness and intentionality that one 
sees in the actual course of the evolution of life on earth. (Ward, 1996, 77-
78)  
 
In such passages these distinguished authors seem to run the risk of 
inserting God’s influence into gaps in the causal order as described by 
science, gaps which further scientific understandings are in the habit of 
closing. 
That is not to say that theistic reflections may not inform research 
programmes in evolutionary science—a good example is Simon Conway 
Morris’s work on convergent evolution, and on the possible yet-to-be-
characterised constraints that may exist on what evolutionary forms are 
ever “tried” (Conway Morris, 2003). But the existence of such constraints, 
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and the reasons underlying them, need to be properly established within 
the methodology of the relevant sciences, and not grafted in from 
theology, however rich the connections that might then be established 
between the resultant science and the theology of creation. 
Of the trio of theological sources Attfield addresses at the end of his 
chapter on “God and evil” I think only Arthur Peacocke truly makes clear 
the importance of the evolutionary theologian engaging with a purely 
naturalistic account of the long narrative of evolution (see for example 
Peacocke, 1990). Any account of the evolutionary process that requires 
God to make up deficiencies in that process starts to fall into the same 
traps that beset intelligent design arguments. In particular, it seems 
inherently problematic to postulate that natural selection, operating on 
spontaneous variants, can accomplish almost all the evolution of 
characteristics of organisms, but that just occasionally the process cannot 
work and had to be either steered or set aside. And, of course, any account 
that involves any significant element of divine steering of the evolutionary 
process by efficient causation, as for example in the proposal of Robert J. 
Russell (Russell, 1998), greatly intensifies the problem of theodicy—it 
makes God not only the author of a process to which vast quantities of 
suffering and extinction are intrinsic, but it also posits that God is 
efficiently active in the process without commuting that disvalue.  
That said, Attfield is quite right that evolution does not and cannot 
establish materialism (Attfield, 2006a, 116). He is also right to point to the 
defects of Stephen Jay Gould’s “non-overlapping magisteria” compromise 
between science and religion, as originally formulated (Gould, 2002), and 
to prefer the formulations of that other agnostic defender of evolutionary 
theism, Michael Ruse. Attfield’s chapter on “Darwinism, Disvalues and 
Design” concludes with a masterly demonstration that predation, and even 
parasitism, the phenomenon that so disturbed Darwin himself, “form no 
significant problem for theists” (Attfield, 2006a, 130), a point to which I 
shall have to return.   
In his “God and Evil” chapter Attfield reformulates the classic problem 
of evil into the proposition that 
 
No other world that God could have created would have had a better 
balance of good over evil than the actual world, despite the many evils it 
contains, has or will have. (Attfield, 2006a, 135). 
 
This is a very interesting move, because of course it raises the spectre of 
Dr Pangloss in Voltaire’s Candide, and Leibniz’ best of all possible 
worlds. Attfield is well aware of the various critiques of best-possible-
world theory. These are summarised for instance in Robert Merrihew 
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Adams’ introduction to his edited The Problem of Evil (Adams, R.M., 
1990). Particularly relevant to my own reservations is Philippa Foot’s 
point, as cited by Adams, that worlds are not good or evil in themselves, 
but good or evil for particular persons or projects (Adams, R.M., 1990, 7), 
and D.Z. Phillips’ general rejection of the consequentialism implicit in 
best-possible-world theory as appropriate to talk about God (Phillips, 
2004, 35-46). I note also Marilyn McCord Adams’ critique that the God of 
Jews and Christians is not depicted by those traditions as an abstract value-
maximiser, but as one who by grace does more for human beings than they 
are worthy to receive (cf. Adams, M.M., 1990, 210). I am not yet clear that 
Attfield’s formulation above escapes all these problems. 
Attfield goes on to show how the Free-Will Defence to moral evil can 
function within such a proposition. He challenges the famous anti-theodicy 
of Ivan Karamazov, who would “return his ticket” if all the goods of the 
world depended on the torture of a single child, as “a disproportionate 
judgement” (Attfield, 2006a, 137). Attfield then shows convincingly how 
the Free-Will and Irenaean defences to moral evil can be combined. When 
he turns to the more difficult problem of natural evil, he concludes that, 
without evidence, it is hard for us to suppose that a better natural system 
could exist (Attfield, 2006a, 141). Though widespread disvalue is 
conceded, its outworkings are seen to be “systemic preconditions of the 
flourishing of billions of creatures across the ages, as well as of human 
capacities and of the human endowment” (Attfield, 2006a, 143). There 
was in Ruse’s phrase “no other way” to realise the range of creaturely 
values we observe other than a world of natural selection, “complete with 
predation, parasitism, agony and suffering and (apparent) waste” (Attfield, 
2006a, 146, drawing on Ruse, 2003, 333). 
In my own monograph I pick up this “only way argument” (Southgate, 
2008b, 47-48). Attfield and I would both be profoundly wary of the bolder 
claim that this is the best possible world. I want only to share the more 
modest claim with which Attfield ends, that a created world realising the 
sorts of values we observe would have to be a Darwinian world. 
It is a thousand pities that Michael Murray wrote Nature Red in Tooth 
and Claw without Attfield’s chapters to draw on. As far as I can see 
Murray never quite grasps the character of Darwinism, and hence he 
doesn’t grasp the force of the “only way” argument as advanced by 
Attfield, Ruse and myself, among others. Nor does Murray ever quite free 
himself from variants of anthropocentrism based on the view that animal 
suffering is at least in part outweighed by the goods arising for human 
beings. But he does come somewhere near to Attfield’s position in his 
eventual theodicy, which is based on affirming both nomic regularity—the 
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importance to all creatures of living in a consistent world, and a world 
moreover in which creatures evolve pain responses to noxious stimuli—
and also what Murray somewhat oddly calls a chaos-to-order universe 
(Murray, 2008, 166-92). I suppose that roughly corresponds to a 
Darwinian universe which, although evolution is not of itself directed, has 
nevertheless manifested a massive increase in complexity over the last 
three billion years.  
Reservations as to Attfield’s Position 
So there are points of contact between Murray’s analysis and 
Attfield’s, though I think Attfield’s is a much clearer and more 
biologically-informed account. There are however two instances where I 
think Murray’s account picks up something important. First, he cites the 
issue raised by Marilyn McCord Adams that 
 
If the good in question requires the evil of treating someone as a means, 
then no-one has the right to permit that person to be treated in this way, 
regardless of the supposed greater good it will bring about. (Murray, 2008, 
187) 
 
Murray properly points to exceptions within the human sphere, such as 
quarantining (a sadly topical subject in 2009 with the advent of so-called 
“swine flu”). But where harms are systemically used to promote goods not 
in those creatures but in others, then there is a charge against the goodness 
of the exploiter of those individuals, and that is the situation with the 
harms occasioned by the evolutionary process. This is, in fact, the 
objection of Ivan Karamazov all over again—if that is how the system 
works, at the expense of the individual sufferer, well then, the protester 
respectfully and with reason returns his ticket. My own position is that this 
argument holds in the sphere of evolutionary evil just as in that of moral 
evil.  
Attfield is right to hold that Ivan’s argument does not imply that it 
would have been better for God not to have created at all. Rather I suggest 
that God’s care and love must be operative at the level of every individual, 
not just in terms of a system that is, on balance, the best that can be 
achieved. And that leads me on to the second of Murray’s insights, which 
is that evolutionary theodicy must be done using a combination of 
arguments (Murray, 2008, 193-99). The only way argument in isolation 
will not do by itself. It fails at the level of the suffering of the individual 
creature. I would hold that it needs to be embedded within a richer account 
of the Christian narrative—one that shows that God’s care and love is 
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always operative, and makes a difference to the individual creature. In my 
own formulation this includes the invocation of God’s co-suffering with 
every creature that suffers, and of Christ’s atoning work at the Cross, and 
it also means postulating a fulfilled life for the victims of evolution in 
some eschatological state.  
This I see as my principal difference from Attfield’s position on 
evolutionary theodicy. In Attfield’s book he merely says that the 
possibility of life after death lies beyond the scope of the present work 
(Attfield, 2006a, 150), so for all I know he will invoke it in some 
subsequent study—during what I hope will be a long and fruitful 
retirement. But I am convinced that merely to argue a theodicy on the 
basis of God as the consequentialist calculator of values against disvalues 
does as D.Z. Phillips has so trenchantly argued lead to an arid and even 
possibly an unholy theology (Phillips, 2004). Hence my insistence on 
offering what Thomas F. Tracy would call a “thick defence” of the justice 
of God, one which draws on the whole arc of the Christian narrative of 
creation and salvation, rather than trusting to a single argument (Tracy, 
2007, 157-60). The “thin defence” of offering a single logical argument 
for God’s righteousness in the face of evolutionary suffering may succeed 
philosophically in showing the logical compossibility of God’s goodness 
and evolutionary evil, and I suspect that is Attfield’s objective. But I 
continue to consider that it is vulnerable to a version of the objection of 
Ivan Karamazov, and what is more that it does little of itself to enrich our 
understanding of the God of evolutionary creation, as I have tried to do in 
my more extended treatment (Southgate, 2008b, Chs. 3-5; Southgate, 2011). 
The final component of my theodicy is a sense of the high calling of 
humanity as having a part in the redemption of the non-human creation. It 
is particularly interesting to me to see how—in both Attfield’s work and 
my own—the way theodicy is framed has implications for ethics. It seems 
to me that because Attfield is satisfied with this as the world with the 
optimal balance of value over against disvalue, without the need to invoke 
other elements such as eschatological fulfilment, so it is natural for him to 
work on the basis of a stewardship ethic focussed very much on the 
preservation of the systems that embody this optimal balance. Whereas the 
implication of my own approach is that this profoundly ambiguous world 
stands much in need of healing by God, and that after the Cross and 
Resurrection of Christ we live in the era of that transformative healing. I 
therefore argue for a co-redeemerly environmental ethic (Southgate, 
2008b, Chs. 6-7; see also Southgate, 2009). The remainder of this chapter 
will be an exploration of some of these distinctions, and I shall then end on 
some points of agreement. 
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Issues around Stewardship 
It is familiar ground in recent Christian theology that stewardship, as 
an image for the human vocation in respect of the non-human creation, is 
both commonplace—almost now the default position—and yet under 
heavy attack from a range of scholars. For a recent survey see Berry 2006. 
Particularly important critiques include Clare Palmer’s denunciation of 
stewardship as being (in the sense in which it is popularly used) unbiblical 
(Palmer, 1992). Anne Primavesi has condemned the concept of 
stewardship as exploitative and unecological (Primavesi, 1991, 106-7). 
Sean McDonagh is concerned that “within the context of this analogy the 
earth is reified and becomes either inert property to be cared for or 
financial resources to be managed in a way that gives a good return on the 
investment”. (McDonagh, 1994, 130). Edward Echlin claims that 
stewardship “easily lends itself to a detached and manipulative view of 
creation” and that it “has not moved hearts” (Echlin, 2004, 16). Bill 
McKibben regards it as “so lacking in content as to give us very little 
guidance about how to behave in any given situation” (McKibben, 1994, 
51). Beyond that stewardship carries the implicit presumption that there is 
some state or character of the non-human creation, knowable by humans, 
that we are in a position to steward. And Attfield does note this criticism, 
as deployed by Richard Evanoff (Attfield, 2006a, 198-99). Do we yet 
know enough about the Earth to consider ourselves its stewards? Here 
Attfield helpfully responds by pointing out that a stewardly approach must 
be combined with vigorous use of the precautionary principle “where 
irreversible harms or the crossing of ecological thresholds are in question” 
(Attfield, 2006a, 199). 
Attfield addresses some of the other classic criticisms of stewardship in 
his own article in the Berry book (Attfield, 2006b), in turn an amended 
version of a chapter in The Ethics of the Global Environment (Attfield, 
1999). The reasonableness of the tone of this rebuttal is classic Attfield. 
My reaction on reading this piece is merely to note that the rhetorical 
flavour of an image such as that of the steward does not equate to its 
currency in philosophical analysis. The image may be carefully deployed 
by the reasonable philosopher, and yet continue to carry the wrong 
connotations when bandied around in the literature and politics of 
environmentalism. However, Attfield does in my view establish that the 
image of “steward” (I suspect he rather prefers that of “trustee”) is at least 
consistent with sound environmental practice. While he does not convince 
me that stewardship “has been a central approach” throughout the 
Christian centuries (Attfield, 2006b, 84), nevertheless he establishes a 
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plausible continuity between the image of “tending the garden” in Gen. 2 
(an image which has found favour with evangelicals, see for example 
Granberg-Michaelson, 1987), environmental practice in mediaeval 
Benedictinism, and the explicit adoption of stewardship in the work of 
Matthew Hale and those who followed him. (Attfield, 2006b, 81-84) His 
case is that the image need not lead to a sense that the landlord is absent, 
or that the land is merely a resource to be managed, or indeed exploited or 
manipulated.  
I think it is at least one small pity that my own article on stewardship 
appeared just at the time Attfield’s Creation, Evolution and Meaning was 
itself being published. I would have hoped to persuade him that while 
stewardship can be one element in a Christian environmental ethic, 
appropriately deployed in a particular range of circumstances, other 
emphases are also important (cf. Southgate, 2006). In particular I am 
concerned that the usual connotations of the word “stewardship” are in 
terms of caution about the future—“stewardship” of “resources” seeks to 
provide a future no worse than the present. There is an implication here 
(which most of the relevant ecotheologians would probably hotly deny) 
that indeed things tend to get worse, and stewardship is important to 
protect God’s Earth because we do not expect its miraculous deliverance 
or transformation, at any rate any time soon. 
Examples of this approach—stewardship as preservation—can be 
found in Lawrence Osborn’s work (Osborn, 1993), also in Earthkeeping in 
the Nineties: Stewardship of Creation by Peter de Vos et al. De Vos et al 
talk of the calling of the shepherd to “maintain the flock” (de Vos et al., 
1991, 292), and note that the  
 
‘commons’ face despoiling, if they are not already spoiled. Perhaps, 
therefore, the call to stewardship of the ‘commons’ translates to the 
establishing of governing bodies, capable of restricting the use of the 
commons (de Vos et al., 1991, 323).  
 
There is no future hope in this ethic—other than, in some advocates of 
stewardship, a dubiously biblical hope that one day humans might be able 
to recreate Eden. Given the sometimes casual talk about Eden in some of 
the ecotheological literature it is very important to question whether the 
evidence of the biblical witness does in fact point to a restoration of an 
initial harmony. Hans Urs von Balthasar for one is clear that it does not. 
He writes: “The New Testament nowhere speaks of the recovery of a lost 
glory of the original state, but rather of the eschatological achieving of the 
righteousness and glory of God in his cosmos” (von Balthasar, 1989, 297; 
cf. also O’Donovan, 1994, 55-56).  
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Now Attfield seems to me to invoke in Creation Evolution and 
Meaning a much more active vision of stewardship than some, speaking 
not just of “preservation” but of “rehabilitation” (Attfield, 2006a, 194) but 
he still uses the language of the steward as “trustee”, as “guardian” 
(Attfield, 2006a, 193). Not only does this language play into the 
frequently-levelled charge that it makes God appear to be an absentee 
owner—trustees or guardians are needed because the normal authority of 
the owner is absent—but it stresses to a greater extent than I think is 
appropriate the notion that we are to hold on grimly to what God has left 
behind. 
In some recent work, in collaboration with the New Testament scholars 
David Horrell and Cherryl Hunt, I have been exploring the implicit 
cosmological narratives lying behind some ecotheologies, and considering 
them in terms of Northrop Frye’s analysis of narrative genre (Horrell et al., 
2010). It seems to me that some of the versions of stewardship to which I 
have referred are based on an implicit narrative that things always tend to 
get worse, what Frye would term an ironic narrative. Such a narrative 
receives biblical support, especially in Qoheleth, and God’s answer to Job 
in Job 38-41—an answer described by McKibben as “deeply sarcastic” 
(McKibben, 1994, 35), as it mocks the notion that humans can 
comprehend the ways of the world. An ironic, pragmatic version of 
stewardship would draw sustenance from that type of vision. But what I 
argue is that that genre of narrative is hard to reconcile with the implicit 
cosmologies we find in the New Testament, and with the strong conviction 
in the Pauline corpus that Christian ethics must be eschatological. If we 
look at the classic passage in which Paul addresses the non-human 
creation, Rom. 8. 19-22, I think we can see not only the conviction that 
creation’s current condition is regarded as part of God’s hope for the 
future, pregnant with possibilities, but also that creation’s future is tied up 
with the children of God coming into their freedom, a freedom that is 
glory. 
So this is a narrative of hope, and of the believers’ struggle to live out 
their freedom in Christ, a freedom that in turn participates in the liberating 
of creation. I strongly question whether stewardship, even what Osborn 
would describe as strong stewardship (Osborn, 1993), can do justice to this 
vision. So I have suggested—very controversially—that humans have a 
part, with God, in the healing of the world. So I side with Ronald Cole-
Turner in his suggestion that humans can be co-redeemers with God—as 
also with his comment that we are at the same time “creatures who 
constantly stand in need of redemption” (Cole-Turner, 1993, 102). My 
specific suggestion, again controversial, is that humans in their redeemed 
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freedom might be called to reduce the rate of biological extinction. 
Thomas Berry has written: 
 
Extinction is a difficult concept to grasp. It is an eternal concept. It’s not at 
all like the killing of individual life forms that can be renewed through 
normal processes of reproduction. Nor is it simply diminishing numbers. 
Nor is it damage that can somehow be remedied or for which some 
substitute can be found. Nor is it something that only affects our own 
generation. Nor is it something that could be remedied by some 
supernatural power. It is, rather, an absolute and final act for which there is 
no remedy on earth as in heaven. (Berry, 1998, 9; cf. also McDonagh, 
2004) 
 
Although extinction has been part of the driver of evolution over the last 
three and more billion years, it is always as Berry implies a loss to the 
creation of a whole strategy of being alive, a whole way in which God is 
praised in God’s creation. In this eschatological era a sustained initiative to 
try and limit any further extinction might be our part in God’s eventual 
healing of the world, the reconciliation of all things in Christ (Col. 1.20).   
However, the tragedy of our current predicament is that so far from 
reducing the rate of non-anthropogenic extinction, we are in the process of 
engendering, through our elevation of the planet’s natural greenhouse 
effect, a sixth great extinction event, estimated even by a document as 
cautious as the Stern Report as likely to lead a level of extinction possibly 
as high as 60% of all mammals (Yohe, 2007, 106). So before we can even 
begin to think of addressing the levels of non-anthropogenic extinction, 
there is a vital imperative to address a deepening crisis engendered or at 
least greatly exacerbated by human activity, that of climate change. And 
here is where I come back more onto Attfield’s ground, because this is an 
example I believe of where stewardship language can be helpful. Things 
are indeed getting worse very quickly, and active management to preserve 
elements of the biosphere, possibly even including major projects in the 
translocation of species, will surely be necessary. I have recently proposed 
as a thought-experiment the possibility of moving polar bears to the coast 
of Antarctica (Southgate, 2009, 262-65). 
I was particularly fascinated, when I was reading out Attfield’s paper 
in Crete, to see that he and I were working along similar lines in 
environmental ethics. Both of us were considering as a priority the need to 
give voice to the voiceless, to empower those whom the current crisis is 
rapidly disempowering. Attfield’s emphasis in that paper (now published 
in The Journal of Global Ethics (Attfield, 2009b)) is on empowering the 
poor so that they can also take up the call to stewardship and trusteeship. 
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And he also has a strong sense of future generations as partners in the 
project of stewardship—he describes “the true subject of stewardship” as 
“an intergenerational collective” (Attfield, 2006a, 200). I also have 
become very interested in the issue of future generations. I am concerned 
about future human generations as disempowered and dislocated, in some 
cases losing even the possibility of remaining in their ancient home—one 
has only think of somewhere like the Andaman Islands, a locus rich in 
unusual culture and language but much of it likely actually to disappear as 
ocean levels rise. But I also consider in recent work future generations of 
non-human creatures which may lose even the opportunity to exist, let 
alone flourish, as a result of climate change. These, it may be argued, are 
the new anawim, the new poor to whom we should be paying attention as 
God’s special care and concern (Southgate, 2009, 258-60). 
I have been arguing strongly and explicitly from the standpoint of 
Christian ethics, and I have shown that my approach leads me sometimes 
to a rather different emphasis from Attfield’s, but sometimes into some 
interesting convergences. I would like to note lastly that Attfield’s appeal 
to “secular stewardship” (Attfield, 2006a, 201-2) provides a valuable 
meeting ground with ethicists of other faiths and none, and may therefore 
be much more influential in the current context than an appeal to an 
eschatological Christian ethic. And I think Attfield makes a fascinating 
observation when he talks of how widespread the impulse to thankfulness 
is even among secular environmentalists. This, like the impulse to wonder 
found even in secularists as rabid as Richard Dawkins, is an intriguing hint 
of how a response to God may lurk even in the most unexpected quarters.  
I end by restating how profoundly grateful I am both to Attfield for his 
work and for the privilege of speaking and writing in his honour. 
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